(b) Explain and give examples of assertive behaviour. (7 marks)
第1题:
6 An important part of managing people in a professional organisation is to be able to distinguish between aggressiveness and assertiveness in an employee.
Required:
(a) Explain and give examples of aggressive behaviour. (8 marks)
第2题:
4 (a) Explain the meaning of the term ‘working capital cycle’ for a trading company. (4 marks)
第3题:
(b) Distinguish between strategic and operational risks, and explain why the secrecy option would be a source
of strategic risk. (10 marks)
第4题:
(c) Define ‘retirement by rotation’ and explain its importance in the context of Rosh and Company.
(5 marks)
第5题:
(ii) Explain THREE strategies that might be adopted in order to improve the future prospects of Diverse
Holdings Plc. (6 marks)
第6题:
(b) Explain THREE problems in undertaking a performance comparison of GBC and TTC and also explain THREE
items of additional information that would be of assistance in assessing the operating and financial
performance of GBC and TTC. (6 marks)
第7题:
6 (a) Explain the term ‘money laundering’. (3 marks)
第8题:
In relation to the courts’ powers to interpret legislation, explain and differentiate between:
(a) the literal approach, including the golden rule; and (5 marks)
(b) the purposive approach, including the mischief rule. (5 marks)
Tutorial note:
In order to apply any piece of legislation, judges have to determine its meaning. In other words they are required to interpret the
statute before them in order to give it meaning. The diffi culty, however, is that the words in statutes do not speak for themselves and
interpretation is an active process, and at least potentially a subjective one depending on the situation of the person who is doing
the interpreting.
Judges have considerable power in deciding the actual meaning of statutes, especially when they are able to deploy a number of
competing, not to say contradictory, mechanisms for deciding the meaning of the statute before them. There are, essentially, two
contrasting views as to how judges should go about determining the meaning of a statute – the restrictive, literal approach and the
more permissive, purposive approach.
(a) The literal approach
The literal approach is dominant in the English legal system, although it is not without critics, and devices do exist for
circumventing it when it is seen as too restrictive. This view of judicial interpretation holds that the judge should look primarily
to the words of the legislation in order to construe its meaning and, except in the very limited circumstances considered below,
should not look outside of, or behind, the legislation in an attempt to fi nd its meaning.
Within the context of the literal approach there are two distinct rules:
(i) The literal rule
Under this rule, the judge is required to consider what the legislation actually says rather than considering what it might
mean. In order to achieve this end, the judge should give words in legislation their literal meaning, that is, their plain,
ordinary, everyday meaning, even if the effect of this is to produce what might be considered an otherwise unjust or
undesirable outcome (Fisher v Bell (1961)) in which the court chose to follow the contract law literal interpretation of
the meaning of offer in the Act in question and declined to consider the usual non-legal literal interpretation of the word
(offer).
(ii) The golden rule
This rule is applied in circumstances where the application of the literal rule is likely to result in what appears to the court
to be an obviously absurd result. It should be emphasised, however, that the court is not at liberty to ignore, or replace,
legislative provisions simply on the basis that it considers them absurd; it must fi nd genuine diffi culties before it declines
to use the literal rule in favour of the golden one. As examples, there may be two apparently contradictory meanings to a
particular word used in the statute, or the provision may simply be ambiguous in its effect. In such situations, the golden
rule operates to ensure that preference is given to the meaning that does not result in the provision being an absurdity.
Thus in Adler v George (1964) the defendant was found guilty, under the Offi cial Secrets Act 1920, with obstruction
‘in the vicinity’ of a prohibited area, although she had actually carried out the obstruction ‘inside’ the area.
(b) The purposive approach
The purposive approach rejects the limitation of the judges’ search for meaning to a literal construction of the words of
legislation itself. It suggests that the interpretative role of the judge should include, where necessary, the power to look beyond
the words of statute in pursuit of the reason for its enactment, and that meaning should be construed in the light of that purpose
and so as to give it effect. This purposive approach is typical of civil law systems. In these jurisdictions, legislation tends to set
out general principles and leaves the fi ne details to be fi lled in later by the judges who are expected to make decisions in the
furtherance of those general principles.
European Community (EC) legislation tends to be drafted in the continental manner. Its detailed effect, therefore, can only be
determined on the basis of a purposive approach to its interpretation. This requirement, however, runs counter to the literal
approach that is the dominant approach in the English system. The need to interpret such legislation, however, has forced
a change in that approach in relation to Community legislation and even with respect to domestic legislation designed to
implement Community legislation. Thus, in Pickstone v Freemans plc (1988), the House of Lords held that it was permissible,
and indeed necessary, for the court to read words into inadequate domestic legislation in order to give effect to Community
law in relation to provisions relating to equal pay for work of equal value. (For a similar approach, see also the House of Lords’
decision in Litster v Forth Dry Dock (1989) and the decision in Three Rivers DC v Bank of England (No 2) (1996).) However,
it has to recognise that the purposive rule is not particularly modern and has its precursor in a long established rule of statutory
interpretation, namely the mischief rule.
The mischief rule
This rule permits the court to go behind the actual wording of a statute in order to consider the problem that the statute is
supposed to remedy.
In its traditional expression it is limited by being restricted to using previous common law rules in order to decide the operation
of contemporary legislation. Thus in Heydon’s case (1584) it was stated that in making use of the mischief rule the court
should consider what the mischief in the law was which the common law did not adequately deal with and which statute law
had intervened to remedy. Use of the mischief rule may be seen in Corkery v Carpenter (1950), in which a man was found
guilty of being drunk in charge of a carriage although he was in fact only in charge of a bicycle.
第9题:
In relation to company law, explain:
(a) the limitations on the use of company names; (4 marks)
(b) the tort of ‘passing off’; (4 marks)
(c) the role of the company names adjudicators under the Companies Act 2006. (2 marks)
(a) Except in relation to specifically exempted companies, such as those involved in charitable work, companies are required to indicate that they are operating on the basis of limited liability. Thus private companies are required to end their names, either with the word ‘limited’ or the abbreviation ‘ltd’, and public companies must end their names with the words ‘public limited company’ or the abbreviation ‘plc’. Welsh companies may use the Welsh language equivalents (Companies Act (CA)2006 ss.58, 59 & 60).
Companies Registry maintains a register of business names, and will refuse to register any company with a name that is the same as one already on that index (CA 2006 s.66).
Certain categories of names are, subject to the decision of the Secretary of State, unacceptable per se, as follows:
(i) names which in the opinion of the Secretary of State constitute a criminal offence or are offensive (CA 2006 s.53)
(ii) names which are likely to give the impression that the company is connected with either government or local government authorities (s.54).
(iii) names which include a word or expression specified under the Company and Business Names Regulations 1981 (s.26(2)(b)). This category requires the express approval of the Secretary of State for the use of any of the names or expressions contained on the list, and relates to areas which raise a matter of public concern in relation to their use.
Under s.67 of the Companies Act 2006 the Secretary of State has power to require a company to alter its name under the following circumstances:
(i) where it is the same as a name already on the Registrar’s index of company names.
(ii) where it is ‘too like’ a name that is on that index.
The name of a company can always be changed by a special resolution of the company so long as it continues to comply with the above requirements (s.77).
(b) The tort of passing off was developed to prevent one person from using any name which is likely to divert business their way by suggesting that the business is actually that of some other person or is connected in any way with that other business. It thus enables people to protect the goodwill they have built up in relation to their business activity. In Ewing v Buttercup
Margarine Co Ltd (1917) the plaintiff successfully prevented the defendants from using a name that suggested a link with
his existing dairy company. It cannot be used, however, if there is no likelihood of the public being confused, where for example the companies are conducting different businesses (Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v Dunlop Motor Co Ltd (1907)
and Stringfellow v McCain Foods GB Ltd (1984). Nor can it be used where the name consists of a word in general use (Aerators Ltd v Tollitt (1902)).
Part 41 of the Companies Act (CA) 2006, which repeals and replaces the Business Names Act 1985, still does not prevent one business from using the same, or a very similar, name as another business so the tort of passing off will still have an application in the wider business sector. However the Act introduced a new procedure to deal specifically with company names. As previously under the CA 1985, a company cannot register with a name that was the same as any already registered (s.665 Companies Act (CA) 2006) and under CA s.67 the Secretary of State may direct a company to change its name if it has been registered in a name that is the same as, or too like a name appearing on the registrar’s index of company names. In addition, however, a completely new system of complaint has been introduced.
(c) Under ss.69–74 of CA 2006 a new procedure has been introduced to cover situations where a company has been registered with a name
(i) that it is the same as a name associated with the applicant in which he has goodwill, or
(ii) that it is sufficiently similar to such a name that its use in the United Kingdom would be likely to mislead by suggesting a connection between the company and the applicant (s.69).
Section 69 can be used not just by other companies but by any person to object to a company names adjudicator if a company’s name is similar to a name in which the applicant has goodwill. There is list of circumstances raising a presumption that a name was adopted legitimately, however even then, if the objector can show that the name was registered either, to obtain money from them, or to prevent them from using the name, then they will be entitled to an order to require the company to change its name.
Under s.70 the Secretary of State is given the power to appoint company names adjudicators and their staff and to finance their activities, with one person being appointed Chief Adjudicator.
Section 71 provides the Secretary of State with power to make rules for the proceedings before a company names adjudicator.
Section 72 provides that the decision of an adjudicator and the reasons for it, are to be published within 90 days of the decision.
Section 73 provides that if an objection is upheld, then the adjudicator is to direct the company with the offending name to change its name to one that does not similarly offend. A deadline must be set for the change. If the offending name is not changed, then the adjudicator will decide a new name for the company.
Under s.74 either party may appeal to a court against the decision of the company names adjudicator. The court can either uphold or reverse the adjudicator’s decision, and may make any order that the adjudicator might have made.
第10题:
(b) (i) Explain the matters you should consider, and the evidence you would expect to find in respect of the
carrying value of the cost of investment of Dylan Co in the financial statements of Rosie Co; and
(7 marks)
第11题:
(a) List and explain FOUR methods of selecting a sample of items to test from a population in accordance with ISA 530 (Redrafted) Audit Sampling and Other Means of Testing. (4 marks)
(b) List and explain FOUR assertions from ISA 500 Audit Evidence that relate to the recording of classes of
transactions. (4 marks)
(c) In terms of audit reports, explain the term ‘modified’. (2 marks)
第12题:
第13题:
(b) Explain what is meant by McGregor’s
(i) Theory X; (5 marks)
第14题:
(c) Explain what ‘fiduciary responsibility’ means and construct the case for broadening the football club board’s
fiduciary responsibility in this case. (7 marks)
第15题:
(b) Explain the roles of a nominations committee and assess the potential usefulness of a nominations committee
to the board of Rosh and Company. (8 marks)
第16题:
(b) Explain how the use of SWOT analysis may be of assistance to the management of Diverse Holdings Plc.
(3 marks)
第17题:
(ii) Explain how the existing product range and the actions per Note (3) would feature in Ansoff’s
product-market matrix. (7 marks)
第18题:
(c) Advise Alan on the proposed disposal of the shares in Mobile Ltd. Your answer should include calculations
of the potential capital gain, and explain any options available to Alan to reduce this tax liability. (7 marks)

However, an exemption from corporation tax exists for any gain arising when a trading company (or member of a trading
group) sells the whole or any part of a substantial shareholding in another trading company.
A substantial shareholding is one where the investing company holds 10% of the ordinary share capital and is beneficially
entitled to at least 10% of the
(i) profits available for distribution to equity holders and
(ii) assets of the company available for distribution to equity holders on a winding up.
In meeting the 10% test, shares owned by a chargeable gains group may be amalgamated. The 10% test must have been
met for a continuous 12 month period during the 2 years preceding the disposal.
The companies making the disposals must have been trading companies (or members of a trading group) throughout the
12 month period, as well as at the date of disposal. In addition, they must also be trading companies (or members of a trading
group) immediately after the disposal.
The exemption is given automatically, and acts to deny losses as well as eliminate gains.
While Alantech Ltd has owned its holding in Mobile Ltd for 33 months, its ownership of the Boron holding has only lasted
for 10 months (at 1 June 2005) since Boron was acquired on 1 July 2004. Selling the shares in June 2005 will fail the
12 month test, and the gain will become chargeable.
It would be better for the companies to wait for a further month until July 2005 before selling the amalgamated shareholding.
By doing so, they will both be able to take advantage of the substantial shareholdings relief, thereby saving tax of £29,625
assuming a corporation tax rate of 19%.
第19题:
(b) Identify and explain the financial statement risks to be taken into account in planning the final audit.
(12 marks)
第20题:
In relation to the law of contract, distinguish between and explain the effect of:
(a) a term and a mere representation; (3 marks)
(b) express and implied terms, paying particular regard to the circumstances under which terms may be implied in contracts. (7 marks)
This question requires candidates to consider the law relating to terms in contracts. It specifically requires the candidates to distinguish between terms and mere representations and then to establish the difference between express and implied terms in contracts.
(a) As the parties to a contract will be bound to perform. any promise they have contracted to undertake, it is important to distinguish between such statements that will be considered part of the contract, i.e. terms, and those other pre-contractual statements which are not considered to be part of the contract, i.e. mere representations. The reason for distinguishing between them is that there are different legal remedies available if either statement turns out to be incorrect.
A representation is a statement that induces a contract but does not become a term of the contract. In practice it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between the two, but in attempting to do so the courts will focus on when the statement was made in relation to the eventual contract, the importance of the statement in relation to the contract and whether or not the party making the statement had specialist knowledge on which the other party relied (Oscar Chess v Williams (1957) and Dick
Bentley v Arnold Smith Motors (1965)).
(b) Express terms are statements actually made by one of the parties with the intention that they become part of the contract and
thus binding and enforceable through court action if necessary. It is this intention that distinguishes the contractual term from
the mere representation, which, although it may induce the contractual agreement, does not become a term of the contract.
Failure to comply with the former gives rise to an action for breach of contract, whilst failure to comply with the latter only gives rise to an action for misrepresentation.
Such express statements may be made by word of mouth or in writing as long as they are sufficiently clear for them to be enforceable. Thus in Scammel v Ouston (1941) Ouston had ordered a van from the claimant on the understanding that the balance of the purchase price was to be paid ‘on hire purchase terms over two years’. When Scammel failed to deliver the van Ouston sued for breach of contract without success, the court holding that the supposed terms of the contract were too
uncertain to be enforceable. There was no doubt that Ouston wanted the van on hire purchase but his difficulty was that
Scammel operated a range of hire purchase terms and the precise conditions of his proposed hire purchase agreement were
never sufficiently determined.
Implied terms, however, are not actually stated or expressly included in the contract, but are introduced into the contract by implication. In other words the exact meaning and thus the terms of the contract are inferred from its context. Implied terms can be divided into three types.
Terms implied by statute
In this instance a particular piece of legislation states that certain terms have to be taken as constituting part of an agreement, even where the contractual agreement between the parties is itself silent as to that particular provision. For example, under s.5 of the Partnership Act 1890, every member of an ordinary partnership has the implied power to bind the partnership in a contract within its usual sphere of business. That particular implied power can be removed or reduced by the partnership agreement and any such removal or reduction of authority would be effective as long as the other party was aware of it. Some implied terms, however, are completely prescriptive and cannot be removed.
Terms implied by custom or usage
An agreement may be subject to terms that are customarily found in such contracts within a particular market, trade or locality. Once again this is the case even where it is not actually specified by the parties. For example, in Hutton v Warren (1836), it was held that customary usage permitted a farm tenant to claim an allowance for seed and labour on quitting his tenancy. It should be noted, however, that custom cannot override the express terms of an agreement (Les Affreteurs Reunnis SA v Walford (1919)).
Terms implied by the courts Generally, it is a matter for the parties concerned to decide the terms of a contract, but on occasion the court will presume that the parties intended to include a term which is not expressly stated. They will do so where it is necessary to give business efficacy to the contract.
Whether a term may be implied can be decided on the basis of the officious bystander test. Imagine two parties, A and B, negotiating a contract, when a third party, C, interrupts to suggest a particular provision. A and B reply that that particular term is understood. In just such a way, the court will decide that a term should be implied into a contract.
In The Moorcock (1889), the appellants, owners of a wharf, contracted with the respondents to permit them to discharge their ship at the wharf. It was apparent to both parties that when the tide was out the ship would rest on the riverbed. When the tide was out, the ship sustained damage by settling on a ridge. It was held that there was an implied warranty in the contract that the place of anchorage should be safe for the ship. As a consequence, the ship owner was entitled to damages for breach of that term.
Alternatively the courts will imply certain terms into unspecific contracts where the parties have not reduced the general agreement into specific details. Thus in contracts of employment the courts have asserted the existence of implied terms to impose duties on both employers and employees, although such implied terms can be overridden by express contractual provision to the contrary.
第21题:
(b) Explain the matters that should be considered when planning the nature and scope of the examination of
Cusiter Co’s forecast balance sheet and income statement as prepared for the bank. (7 marks)
第22题:
(ii) From the information provided above, recommend the matters which should be included as ‘findings
from the audit’ in your report to those charged with governance, and explain the reason for their
inclusion. (7 marks)
第23题: