短文理解听力原文： Dealers in government and private securities need short-term financing to purchase new securities and carry their existing portfolios of securities until those securities are sold to customers or reach maturity. Such loans are readily granted by

There's been a steady drumbeat of warmings about a surge in risky corporate borrowing-but not much clarity serious the threat is. At issue is the more than S1 million market in leveraged loans. That's Wall Street jargon for loans to business with less than rook-solid finances, Federal Reserve and European Central Hank officials have drawn to the rise in corporate debt and the deterioration or lending standards. The loans are often bundled into securities ollateralized loan obligations (CLOs).
Most of the watchdogs are carceful to say a repeat of the 2007-2008 crisis is unlikely because most of the debt banks. But that creates another problem Regulators focused on banks are largely in the dark when it comes to where the risks he and how they might ripple through the financial system when the economy turns down. A big over-indebted businesses could face severe stress and, in some cases, insolvency, threatening jobs and deepen downturn.
The mechanics of the leveraged loan market will be familiar to students of the housing crisis.
With interesting investors are willing to take greater risks to get higher yields. That makes lots of money available for lending. we makes it easier for less creditworthy companies to borrow .Rather than keep the risky loans on their books, lender them to asset managers that package them into securities -C1Ds-that are sold to investors such as insurers and hedge funds.
Yields on the riskicst portions of CLOs can approach 9% a year. And the growth of leveraged lending has been post crisis bank regulations that helped the rise or shadow lenders financial companics that aren't regulated like market for levcraged loans has more than doubled since 2012.
The risk taking could get worse: With demand by borrowers for levcraged loans declining this year, those still financing have been able to extract looser learns.
About 85% of leveraged loans are held by nonbanks, according to Wells Fargo rescarch.
But banks may play a larger robe than may assumc, according to Gaurav V asisht, drector for financial regulation at the Volcker Alliance, a good-governance group, Banks are involved in all stages of the process. They underwrite loans, sell them to the CLOs, invest in those securities, and then hedge those risks in the market.“One common narrative is that banks don't have much risk or aren't exposed 1o it. Vasisht said at the hearing, "Banks are exposed to it."
Just beeause banks are safer doesn't necessarily mean the financial system is, says Karen Petron, managing partner at Federal Financial Analytics, a regulatory- analysis firm. Debt investors might not be as resilient in a crisis, and their problems could create shock waves. "Banking regulators are being a htte myopic when they 're looking only at the banking system for systemic risk," she says.- Sally Bakewell and Thomas Beardsworth.
What does the undcrlined word "'myopie" mean in the last paragraph?( )

A. optimistic
B. pessimistic
C. short-sighted
D. sarcastic

There's been a steady drumbeat of warmings about a surge in risky corporate borrowing-but not much clarity serious the threat is. At issue is the more than S1 million market in leveraged loans. That's Wall Street jargon for loans to business with less than rook-solid finances, Federal Reserve and European Central Hank officials have drawn to the rise in corporate debt and the deterioration or lending standards. The loans are often bundled into securities ollateralized loan obligations (CLOs).
Most of the watchdogs are carceful to say a repeat of the 2007-2008 crisis is unlikely because most of the debt banks. But that creates another problem Regulators focused on banks are largely in the dark when it comes to where the risks he and how they might ripple through the financial system when the economy turns down. A big over-indebted businesses could face severe stress and, in some cases, insolvency, threatening jobs and deepen downturn.
The mechanics of the leveraged loan market will be familiar to students of the housing crisis.
With interesting investors are willing to take greater risks to get higher yields. That makes lots of money available for lending. we makes it easier for less creditworthy companies to borrow .Rather than keep the risky loans on their books, lender them to asset managers that package them into securities -C1Ds-that are sold to investors such as insurers and hedge funds.
Yields on the riskicst portions of CLOs can approach 9% a year. And the growth of leveraged lending has been post crisis bank regulations that helped the rise or shadow lenders financial companics that aren't regulated like market for levcraged loans has more than doubled since 2012.
The risk taking could get worse: With demand by borrowers for levcraged loans declining this year, those still financing have been able to extract looser learns.
About 85% of leveraged loans are held by nonbanks, according to Wells Fargo rescarch.
But banks may play a larger robe than may assumc, according to Gaurav V asisht, drector for financial regulation at the Volcker Alliance, a good-governance group, Banks are involved in all stages of the process. They underwrite loans, sell them to the CLOs, invest in those securities, and then hedge those risks in the market.“One common narrative is that banks don't have much risk or aren't exposed 1o it. Vasisht said at the hearing, "Banks are exposed to it."
Just beeause banks are safer doesn't necessarily mean the financial system is, says Karen Petron, managing partner at Federal Financial Analytics, a regulatory- analysis firm. Debt investors might not be as resilient in a crisis, and their problems could create shock waves. "Banking regulators are being a htte myopic when they 're looking only at the banking system for systemic risk," she says.- Sally Bakewell and Thomas Beardsworth.
12. Which one is false about the leveraged loans?(。)

A. they are loans provided to companies already holding a considenble amount of debt.
B. It is easier for companies to get leveraged loans.
C. most of the leveraged loans are held by nonbanks.
D. the Federal Reserve is quite sure about the risks of leveraged loans.

Financial institutions deal with financial assets，assets that promise future payments from financial contracts, such as securities and loans.These institutions also deliver services, relying on their reputations to attract customers for relationships ofte

There's been a steady drumbeat of warmings about a surge in risky corporate borrowing-but not much clarity serious the threat is. At issue is the more than S1 million market in leveraged loans. That's Wall Street jargon for loans to business with less than rook-solid finances, Federal Reserve and European Central Hank officials have drawn to the rise in corporate debt and the deterioration or lending standards. The loans are often bundled into securities ollateralized loan obligations (CLOs).
Most of the watchdogs are carceful to say a repeat of the 2007-2008 crisis is unlikely because most of the debt banks. But that creates another problem Regulators focused on banks are largely in the dark when it comes to where the risks he and how they might ripple through the financial system when the economy turns down. A big over-indebted businesses could face severe stress and, in some cases, insolvency, threatening jobs and deepen downturn.
The mechanics of the leveraged loan market will be familiar to students of the housing crisis.
With interesting investors are willing to take greater risks to get higher yields. That makes lots of money available for lending. we makes it easier for less creditworthy companies to borrow .Rather than keep the risky loans on their books, lender them to asset managers that package them into securities -C1Ds-that are sold to investors such as insurers and hedge funds.
Yields on the riskicst portions of CLOs can approach 9% a year. And the growth of leveraged lending has been post crisis bank regulations that helped the rise or shadow lenders financial companics that aren't regulated like market for levcraged loans has more than doubled since 2012.
The risk taking could get worse: With demand by borrowers for levcraged loans declining this year, those still financing have been able to extract looser learns.
About 85% of leveraged loans are held by nonbanks, according to Wells Fargo rescarch.
But banks may play a larger robe than may assumc, according to Gaurav V asisht, drector for financial regulation at the Volcker Alliance, a good-governance group, Banks are involved in all stages of the process. They underwrite loans, sell them to the CLOs, invest in those securities, and then hedge those risks in the market.“One common narrative is that banks don't have much risk or aren't exposed 1o it. Vasisht said at the hearing, "Banks are exposed to it."
Just beeause banks are safer doesn't necessarily mean the financial system is, says Karen Petron, managing partner at Federal Financial Analytics, a regulatory- analysis firm. Debt investors might not be as resilient in a crisis, and their problems could create shock waves. "Banking regulators are being a htte myopic when they 're looking only at the banking system for systemic risk," she says.- Sally Bakewell and Thomas Beardsworth.
According to the article, which of the following statements is true?( d )

A. The mechanics of leveraged loans are different from that of housing crisis.
B. regulators admit that the financial crisis in 2008 might repeat.
C. shadow lenders will be regulated.
D. banks are not immune from the risks of corporate debt.

There's been a steady drumbeat of warmings about a surge in risky corporate borrowing-but not much clarity serious the threat is. At issue is the more than S1 million market in leveraged loans. That's Wall Street jargon for loans to business with less than rook-solid finances, Federal Reserve and European Central Hank officials have drawn to the rise in corporate debt and the deterioration or lending standards. The loans are often bundled into securities ollateralized loan obligations (CLOs).
Most of the watchdogs are carceful to say a repeat of the 2007-2008 crisis is unlikely because most of the debt banks. But that creates another problem Regulators focused on banks are largely in the dark when it comes to where the risks he and how they might ripple through the financial system when the economy turns down. A big over-indebted businesses could face severe stress and, in some cases, insolvency, threatening jobs and deepen downturn.
The mechanics of the leveraged loan market will be familiar to students of the housing crisis.
With interesting investors are willing to take greater risks to get higher yields. That makes lots of money available for lending. we makes it easier for less creditworthy companies to borrow .Rather than keep the risky loans on their books, lender them to asset managers that package them into securities -C1Ds-that are sold to investors such as insurers and hedge funds.
Yields on the riskicst portions of CLOs can approach 9% a year. And the growth of leveraged lending has been post crisis bank regulations that helped the rise or shadow lenders financial companics that aren't regulated like market for levcraged loans has more than doubled since 2012.
The risk taking could get worse: With demand by borrowers for levcraged loans declining this year, those still financing have been able to extract looser learns.
About 85% of leveraged loans are held by nonbanks, according to Wells Fargo rescarch.
But banks may play a larger robe than may assumc, according to Gaurav V asisht, drector for financial regulation at the Volcker Alliance, a good-governance group, Banks are involved in all stages of the process. They underwrite loans, sell them to the CLOs, invest in those securities, and then hedge those risks in the market.“One common narrative is that banks don't have much risk or aren't exposed 1o it. Vasisht said at the hearing, "Banks are exposed to it."
Just beeause banks are safer doesn't necessarily mean the financial system is, says Karen Petron, managing partner at Federal Financial Analytics, a regulatory- analysis firm. Debt investors might not be as resilient in a crisis, and their problems could create shock waves. "Banking regulators are being a htte myopic when they 're looking only at the banking system for systemic risk," she says.- Sally Bakewell and Thomas Beardsworth.
The ollteralized loan obligations (CLOs)( ).

A. are securities back by loans
B. are sold to companies with good finance
C. have very low yields
D. do not have much risks